sharply, and by the end of May 238 patients were in hospital. A further 294 were admitted in June and 8 in July, the last being admitted on 31st July, The outbreak took the shape of a single wave suggesting only one source; there were no proven secondary cases. It was an outbreak involving families. The 507 cases came from 309 households in the city and 33 in surrounding districts, fewer than 0·6 per cent of the 58,000 households in Aberdeen being involved. A history of eating food from the infected shop was given by 391 patients of whom 373 ate cold meat and 18 ate fruit. Thirty-two patients gave a history of family contact only, i.e. they did not eat meat but became ill at approximately the same time as the rest of the household. It is therefore assumed that the organism was passed by mechanical transfer from the original source and not via the excreta of an infected case, and thus these were not cases of secondary spread. The remaining 84 patients could give no history of exposure. Fifty-one patients were unable to state with any precision when they became ill. Figure I A typhoid patient was one who contracted typhoid fever in Aberdeen and had at least part of his investigations carried out there. This definition excluded 8 patients who contracted typhoid while visiting Aberdeen but were treated elsewhere: 3 in Glasgow, 2 in Newcastle, 2 in Dundee and I in Toronto. Diagnostic confirmation of typhoid was bacteriological, i.e. by isolation of the organism from any specimen, or clinical, i.e. clinical diagnosis supported by serological evidence (Table II) . Of the 507 patients, 403 were confirmed bacteriologically and 66 clinically; in 38 typhoid was not confirmed but could not be excluded.
The first patient was admitted to the City Hospital on 16th May; admissions rose I N May 1964, the largest outbreak of typhoid fever in Britain since 1936 occurred in the City of Aberdeen; the causative organism was Salmonella typhi (S. typhi) phage type 34, There were 507 cases and 3 deaths ( Table I) . The age and sex distribution of all typhoid patients when compared with that of the population of Aberdeen shows an excess of 15 to 29-year-old women. This was due to a difference in dietary habits in this group, many of whom were on 'reducing diets' of cold meats and salads. The position of the supermarket on a main bus route in the west end of the city was reflected in a higher concentration of patients from the more prosperous wards and an excess of social classes I and II (Table III) .
Persistent Excreters. A controlled doubleblind trial of ampicillin was carried out in the early convalescent stage of excretion, i.e. in patients excreting the organism after the initial course of chemotherapy. The aim was to find out whether a 10-day course of ampicillin at this stage would hasten clearance and reduce the ultimate number of carriers. Later excreters including some patients from the ampicillin trial were given a 3 months course of ampicillin. The results will be published elsewhere.
I
The position I year after the outbreak IS that 5 known chronic carriers remain.
PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS
Aberdeen (city population 186,000 and environs about 50,000) is the most northerly large city in the Commonwealth, the regional 'capital' of a large agricultural and fishing area and a popular holiday resort.
At the time of the outbreak Aberdeen still had considerable overcrowding and housing shortages but had nevertheless achieved good health statistics (e.g. no cases of diphtheria in the last 8 years, none of poliomyelitis in the previous 2 years and an average infant death rate of 19 per thousand live births in the last 3 years). In May 1964 the Health and Welfare Department was suffering from staff shortages more severe than ever before, in all about one-fifth of the professional staff of the Department.
The first patient sickened on 12th May and the numbers under treatment gradually rose but nobody initially suspected typhoid, unknown in Aberdeen for many years. The first case was diagnosed on Wednesday 20th May. By midnight on that day, 12 patients from 5 households were in hospital and the suspicions of the Health and Welfare Department were converging on a dairy, an icecream shop and the cold meat department of a supermarket.
During the period 21st to 23rd May it gradually became clear that the early suspicions of the dairy and the ice-cream shop were unwarranted but that nearly all patients (38 out of 41 admitted up to 23rd May) could recall having eaten cold meat from the super-market during the probable incubation period and about three-quarters of them remembered eating sliced corned beef.
The corned beef aetiology received considerable support on Saturday 23rd May, when the organism was identified by the Colindale Laboratory as phage type 34, a variety common in South America and Spain but virtually unknown in Britain. By that date the supermarket had been thoroughly cleansed and no carrier or person ever resident in 'typhoid' areas had been found; and no cases are regarded as having originated thereafter.
The evidence up to about Tuesday 26th May pointed simply to a limited outbreak confined to persons who had eaten corned beef from a single infected large tin and sold in slices between 6th and 9th May; but thereafter the picture changed-more and more cases appeared with a history of having eaten other cold meats from the supermarket and it slowly became apparent that the slicing machine used for corned beef had infected other cold meats on 8th or 9th May and that multiplication of organisms had occurred when these lightly contaminated meats had been stored in an uncooled display window exposed to sunlight. The numbers potentially at risk approximated to 35,000.
Consequently the 4 days 26th to 29th May witnessed various measures made necessary by the potential scale of the epidemic, notably a health education drive decided on by the Health and Welfare Department and the initiation of a daily meeting of representatives of bacteriologists, general practitioners, health visitors, health education lecturers, hospital administrators, clinicians and public health medical officers to co-ordinate the entire campaign. These meetings were held every day for about 3 weeks. Cases developed in no fewer than 23 other food-handling institutions, including 8 of the largest in the city, and considerable problems arose in respect of closure of premises and seizure or non-seizure of food that might be contaminated. There were no secondary outbreaks. The fourfold aim of the Department's health education campaign was-to ensure perfect food hygiene by all citizens, to create voluntary stoppage of sale of all foods liable to manual contamination and not subsequently cooked, to discourage needless travel and to allay panic.
The 'all clear' was formally given on 17th June, 28 days after the first notifications of suspects.
The spread of the disease Four phases seem apparent in the spread of the disease.
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I. A six-pound tin of corned beef canned in South America became contaminated, presumably through the sealing of the tin being defective. At the canning plant regarded as involved, the chlorination apparatus had been out of use for some 14 months, the corned beef tins had in fact been cooled in unchlorinated river water, and the river water so used had received the untreated sewage of 600,000 people (amounting to 66 tons of excrement a day and 250,000 gallons of urine), and this in a country with 10,000 cases of typhoid a year, including many of the same phage type as was found in Aberdeen.
2. The tin (with the meat still of normal appearance, taste and smell) passed to an Aberdeen supermarket with good general hygienic standards, and was sold sliced on 6th to 9th May. Individuals who ate the original sliced meat had a very short incubation period, the first cases becoming ill on 12th to 15th May.
3. The same slicing machine used for cutting the corned beef was employed for other cold meats, and some of these, lightly contaminated via the slicing machine, were storedquite legally-in an uncooled display case, which, warmed by sunshine, acted as an incubator. Until 22nd or 23rd May it is presumed that organisms were present in the cold meats in the display case. Out of something like 35,000 people who ate cold meat purchased from the supermarket in the period 6th to 23rd May about 50 were directly infected from the original corned beef and more than 400 were infected through multiplication of organisms in stored cold meats.
4. The Health and Welfare Department's actions between 20th May and 23rd May coincided with complete cessation of all spread from the supermarket.
Questions clearly relevant to the above explanation include:
I. Can corned beef, normally regarded as one of the safest forms of food, become infected before the tin is opened? It has been argued that tins of freshly cooked corned beef contain no organisms; that since a tin is sealed, cooling in contaminated water is irrelevant; and that if organisms did gain entry the tin would become blown and would be rejected. Apart from earlier outbreaks associated with canned meat (Milne Report, 1964) , there is ample evidence that canned food of normal appearance can become contaminated with a variety of viable organisms (Sandiford, 1954; U.S. Communicable Disease Center Report, 1964) .
2. Is there any alternative explanation of the source and mode of spread? Interrogation and re-interrogation of patients and their family contacts revealed that, of 41 cases admitted to hospital up to 23rd May, 38 had eaten sliced cold meat bought from the supermarket about the crucial time and 29 of these mentioned corned beef without prompting. Allowing for human forgetfulness, especially in toxic patients, and for possible occasional concealment, that proportion is as high as can be expected in a disease of relatively long incubation. Moreover, there were many subsidiary points, e.g. two families always having the same food except on one of the crucial days when the single member who escaped typhoid was the only person who did not eat corned beef; and victims who had eaten only a single meal, including corned beef, in Aberdeen.
No origin outside th.e supermarket's meat department is possible because: other than that department no source of food or drink was common to a majority or even a very large minority of patients except water (and many patients from a distance had not drunk Aberdeen water); out of 431 persons admitted to hospital up to 10th June no fewer than 351 (or 83 %) recalled having eaten food purchased from the supermarket and 333 of them (or 77%) were quite specific about cold meat; and action taken at the supermarket coincided with the cessation of new incubations.
In the supermarket itself, a carrier might theoretically have started the outbreak by infecting a tin of corned beef after it had been opened, but not only did extensive investigation reveal no carrier, but, in addition, no member of the supermarket staff had ever visited any area in which phage type 34 has been found.
Control measures
Stage of nescience from 6th May to 20th May. If we assume an average period of 2 days The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak of 1964 between purchase and ingestion of food, an average incubation period of 14 days and an average of 2 days from sickening to hospital admission, then the 380 cases who entered hospital on or before 6th June would all be incubating typhoid before 20th May; and slightly more generous assumptions would make the number who were either ill or incubating the disease before its existence was known even to the Medical Officer of Health 431, including 14 already in hospital.
Stage of exploration, roughly 20th to 23rd May. In this period there was intense activity focussed increasingly on the supermarket. Two points should be noticed about this stage: no-one as yet knew the source or method of spread; and nobody could hazard even a guess at the size of the outbreak: at midnight on the 22nd the total number of known cases was only 27.
Stage of apparent limited outbreak, roughly 23rd or 24th to 26th May. There were 79 cases or suspect cases in hospital on the morning of 26th May. At this stage it looked as though, unless secondary cases occurred, the outbreak would be confined to those who had eaten the corned beef from the infected tin. Early diagnosis and isolation of cases, surveillance of contacts, seizure of any suspected food and cleansing of suspected premises seemed the main measures required.
Stage of full-scale outbreak, roughly 26th May till 17th June. In this period the Health and Welfare Department, faced with the knowledge that all the persons who had eaten cold meat purchased from the supermarket between 6th and 23rd May were potentially at risk, used publicity media on an unprecedented scale. Stage of aftermath. This final stage, which includes the long-term follow-up of ali typhoid patients, the increased examination of sewer swabs, and the maintenance of food hygiene, is still continuing.
After discharge from hospital (see below) all patients had 3, 6 or 9 specimens of stool and urine taken at weekly intervals. Those who had little or no contact with food for the general public required only 3 further negative tests; housewives, teachers, etc. required 6, while food handlers required 9 to achieve this weekly programme of clearance. Thereafter speermens of stool and urine were to be examined at intervals of 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. At the time of writing the 6-month examination has been completed, with a few defaulters. Known carriers under surveillance number 5.
Health visitors
Health visitors took part in the bedside interrogation of patients and follow-up of their contacts, both to obtain information and to give guidance about hygiene. Senior health visiting staff attended the daily meetings of the co-ordinating representative committee. Ante-natal clinics and child welfare clinics were continued with reduced staff, both for their ordinary functions and for education in respect of typhoid and food handling. Twothirds of the health visiting staff were taken off all normal duties and engaged in following up of contacts, advising on hygiene and organising the collection of specimens.
Two health visitors acted as a permanent liaison between the hospitals, the 'contact clinic' and the Health and Welfare Department. A further four health visitors assisted a public health doctor in the investigation of employees' health in several shops. For the follow-up of contacts in their own homes, questionnaire and instruction sheets we~e. distributed to the staff in order that all health VISItors would follow the same procedure and so minimise the chance of vital questions remaining unasked. Each contact had a blood test taken by the general practitioner as soon as possible, followed by another in 7 days. A week later, faeces and unne were tested and tested again at intervals of 4 days and the~.7 days .. As far as possible the same team of health VISItors VISIted the same households to provide containers for subsequent specimens and give continuity in .advice. Following their home visits information received was passed to the Nursing Offi~er and essential details reported to the M.O.H. General practitioners at the 'contact clinic' were assisted by 2 health visitors, 2 clinic nurses and a clerical staff of 2. Some 4200 contacts were followed up and kept under surveillance in the city alone. A written list of instructions to contacts, containing seven simple and vital rules, was hand~d out by the visiting staff to each affected household In order to strengthen the verbal instructions given.
For the follow-up of discharged patients, 2 members of staff with cars were allocated full time, a health visitor to distribute containers and persuade patients to submit specimens at the appropriate times, and an auxiliary nurse to collect the specimens.
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Health education aspects When it was realised that the thousands who had eaten cold meat purchased from the supermarket between 6th and 23rd May were potentially at risk, it became clear that the outbreak could not be controlled simply by surveillance. There was no way of differentiating the hundreds who were incubating the disease from the thousands who had escaped, and no rapid way of identifying customers even if it had been practicable to follow up over 30,000 people. Moreover, early cases had the unusual symptom of diarrhoea with possible profuse excretion of S. typhi. Manifestly the hundreds incubating the disease would include commercial food handlers and many domestic food handlers; and faulty personal hygiene by a single food handler has been the cause of many outbreaks, often prolonged for months.
A deliberate attempt was therefore made, by the use of all available techniques and media-in a city that already had a wellestablished health education unit-to raise the personal hygiene of all food handlers to something approaching perfection; to secure voluntarily a temporary cessation of sale of all foods which might have been handled by a person incubating typhoid and would not subsequently be cooked; to discourage needless travel and make persons who deemed their journeys necessary very aware of their moral obligations in respect of personal hygiene; to give people a rational picture of the disease and of measures for its eradication; and to reduce public alarm. This was done by individual and group education as opportunity arose, by practical example (provision of paper towels in schools, abolition of the charge for washing facilities in public lavatories), by leaflets and booklets and by use of the mass media. Press conferences were held twice daily from 26th May, and the M.O.H. gave many interviews on television and sound radio. There is some evidence that this intensive campaign achieved the desired effects at the time but, expectedly, was less successful in its long term influence. By September food hygiene in shops had deteriorated considerably, pointing the need for continuing health education.
THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER
The first report that there was typhoid in Aberdeen was given in the evening of 21 st May, on radio and television. General practitioners knew little more than their patients about the epidemic and its implications. Patients at this time were asking for information which they were unable to give.
On 24th May, a telephone message from the Health and Welfare Department gave the first indication of the probable source and a circular was issued defining a 'typhoid confact'.
The aspects of the epidemic which most concerned the general practitioner are described under the following headings: diagnosis, contacts, immunisation, communication.
Diagnosis
The very early cases resembled gastroenteritis with high fever and headache, but these few cases reached hospital before typhoid was confirmed. Later cases presented with an influenzal type illness, invariably associated with headache, but without diarrhoea, vomiting or sore throat. In some cases severe generalised abdominal pain was experienced. The cardinal features were undoubtedly headache and high fever, and patients showing these were considered highly suspect, though the clinical diagnosis was practically complete if a history of having eaten food from the supermarket was obtained. The classical picture of typhoid with splenomegaly and rose spots was rarely seen in general practice. (See also Table V.)
Contacts
The agreed definition of a typhoid contact was 'any person residing in the same house as a known case or who had eaten food prepared or handled by a known case'.
In the early days, some blood samples were taken during the possible incubation period when no test was of actual value. This was rectified by a 'Noles for guidance' circular produced by the local Medical Committee with advice from the staff of the City Hospital. These were brief but of inestimable value as a baseline from which to work.
Up to 5th June, all screening was being done by general practitioners on their own premises. The publication of names and addresses of victims in the local press, and the implications therefrom, added greatly to the numbers of 'contacts', though a large percentage of these did not in fact come within the agreed definition. Most practices ran contact clinics outwith normal surgery hours.
The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak of 1964 Surgeries became grossly overcrowded when they included groups of contacts.
To review those patients mentioned above who had been screened too early in the epidemic, a blood sampling clinic was established on 5th June. This was staffed voluntarily by general practitioners on a rota basis. It was open morning and evening, 7 days a week, with help provided by the local authority. It was a source of satisfaction that the rota was 'over-subscribed' and that retired practitioners offered to help. This was a most successful venture and, in its later stages, it dealt with all contacts, thus relieving the family doctor of part of his load at the surgery.
As an indication of the volume of work in the screening of suspects and contacts, the following figures are from a practice of 5 partners and almost 10,000 patients. The blood sampling was done largely in the first 2 weeks. The number of patients tested was 460 (280 female and 180 male), i.e. 4'7 per cent of the whole practice. The tests done numbered: Widals 604, faeces 541, urines 467, a total of 1612. Twenty-two patients were admitted to hospital of whom 15 were confirmed, II females and 4 males.
T.A.B. immunisation
It was the end of May, the threshold of the holiday season. With so many people either going elsewhere in the United Kingdom or abroad, the question of T.A.B. immunisation reared its controversial head. This seemed a problem which could not long be confined to the Aberdeen area. So large did it loom in the day's work that the general practitioner representatives on the representative committee pressed for urgent consideration of the matter at the highest level.
Unfortunately, some tourist agencies were making it a condition of acceptance that their clients be immunised irrespective of whether they were visiting a typhoid endemic area or not; the implication being that, since they came from or near Aberdeen, they would not be admitted to a hotel in the United Kingdom or abroad unless they could provide recent evidence of T.A.B. immunisation. One could hardly imagine a more irrational recommendation. It should be pointed out that this action created a risk of misdiagnosis. If any recently immunised person developed a febrile illness or 'gastro-enteritis', he would certainly show on investigation a. high or rising antibody titre. Thus the patient might suffer considerable inconvenience and expense to no purpose. When tourist agencies demanded evidence of T.A.B. immunisation as a condition of travel the point was conceded. Otherwise T.A.B. immunisation was confined to medical, nursing and ancillary staffs in hospital, general practitioners and their staff. It was considered inadvisable to massimmunise-e.g. in schools or colleges where a case or cases of typhoid had arisen-and to have acceded to countless requests by individuals not in these categories would have been tantamount to accepting mass immunisation of the city, a task certainly beyond the resources of the family doctor. As it was, hundreds of people were immunised during the epidemic with very few unfavourable reactions. Immunisation was done by the intradermal route: 0·2 ml. was given and repeated after a 10-day interval or preferably longer.
Communication
The communication between the laboratory and clinical staff of the City Hospital and the general practitioner could not have been improved. Positive results were transmitted within a matter of hours by telephone from the City Hospital laboratory and confirmed in writing next day. The fact that many people had previously received T.A.B. in the Services and elsewhere made diagnosis more complicated, some producing remarkably high positive titres. The positive Widal test, therefore, had to be interpreted in relation to the history and symptomatology of the particular patient with or without the result of clot culture. Where doubt still remained, a repeat Widal test was done a week later. A patient with a low titre Widal test, e.g. 1/25, showing symptoms was treated as a suspect and admitted to hospital.
The daily meeting of representatives of all parts of the Health Service connected with the outbreak was an invaluable instrument of communication. Here there was full and frank discussion of the problems as they arose. Any points relevant to general practitioners were conveyed to them in writing at the earliest moment. After the formation of this committee information flowed out, great help 472 being given by the staff of the Health Executive Council.
Finally, through the very nature of this particular epidemic, much valuable time had to be spent in allaying the fears and anxieties of the public. In fact, a fair amount of the day's work was in the nature of a 'Citizens' Advice Bureau'.
HOSPITAL SERVICES

Administrative aspects
The first and main weight of the hospital load fell on the City Hospital administered by the Board of Management for the Aberdeen Special Hospitals. Later, other hospitals managed by this Board and also by the General Hospitals Board became involved. Committee procedures were eliminated and medical administrators both at Regional Board and Board of Management level were given a free hand to take any necessary action.
Although at the start of the outbreak only a few beds set aside for infectious diseases at the City Hospital were available, arrangements were made, with the co-operation of the clinicians concerned, for the evacuation of wards used for other purposes, notably gynaecology, geriatrics, tuberculosis, rheumatology and general medicine. It soon became apparent that beds in other hospitals would be needed and with instant co-operation from all members of staff, senior members of which were several times called together at short notice, a major reshuffle of much of Aberdeen's acute medical and surgical resources took place. Hospitals successively admitting typhoid cases were Aberdeen City Hospital, Tor-na-dee Hospital, The Royal Aberdeen Hospital for Sick Children and Woodend Hospital.
With the helpful co-operation of the Eastern Regional Board beds were held in instant readiness in Dundee, but it was considered desirable to contain the load in Aberdeen if possible and it proved unnecessary to call on this reserve.
A delivery team of an obstetrician and a midwife was ready to go out from the Maternity Hospital to deliver any woman who went into labour in a typhoid ward. Only one call was made on their services, with a happy outcome. Arrangements were also made to nurse in small wards any patients The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak of 1964 Co-ordinating centre. It became evident early in the epidemic that special steps would have to be taken with regard to in-patient records, accurate documentation and distribution of information both within the hospitals and to the outside, especially to general practitioners. The Group Medical Superintendent set up a co-ordinating centre at the City Hospital and dealt personally with outside public relations.
The co-ordinating centre was established in a classroom and a large office. Two doctors worked here with a variable number of clerical staff-4 at the height of the epidemic. All admissions were routed via the co-ordinating centre and a master index of all patients was kept there. Laboratory reports were sent to the Centre and telephoned from there to either the ward concerned, the M.O.H. or the general practitioner. Written reports were sent subsequently in the normal way.
The establishment of the co-ordinating centre and the firm grip which this mechanism kept on all information was of the greatest value and continued to playa major role in the follow-up of discharged patients. Six extra telephone lines were installed to cope with the vast increase in telephone traffic.
Patients'morale. Special consideration had to be given to the psychological aspects of a long stay in hospital, for patients who did not feel ill for any length of time. On 10th June arrangements were made to accommodate families together. This boosted morale greatly and was much appreciated by the patients and their relatives. From 9th June a group of teachers braved the exaggerated fears then abroad and gave their much appreciated services in occupying the minds of children reaching convalescence. Three circulars were issued to patients at intervals telling them about typhoid fever and explaining the need for careful follow-up. A selection of indoor and outdoor games was provided in addition to extra television receivers and several concerts were given in the grounds by military and police bands.
Temporary additional staff. This included 2 retired consultant physicians, 2 bacteriologists on loan from the University of St Andrews, 2 registrars and 2 house officers. Fifty-six additional nurses gave their services in response to a local appeal, and 8 were seconded from the Western Region for 3 weeks. These measures supplemented a redeployment of both medical and nursing staff. Nurses with infectious disease training were dispersed among the typhoid receiving wards. Seven additional technicians, some of them volunteers from outside the region, were employed at the City Hospital laboratory. Twenty-one extra clerical staff were taken on, some of whom were volunteers refusing payment. There was naturally considerable disruption of normal hospital services and waiting Jist admissions were reduced or, in some units, suspended. Emergency admissions were dealt with normally but it is interesting that the number of these dropped during the period. In all of the hospitals visitors were forbidden to bring in food to patients. Unconsumed food was not returned to the main kitchen but was destroyed. Staff had to leave the wards and go to staff accommodation for any meals or refreshments.
Laboratory aspects
Admission rate. At the height of the outbreak on 2nd June, 39 patients were admitted in 24 hours but from this peak the daily number of patients fell until by mid June only 2 or 3 patients per day were being admitted and this rate tailed off to one a day on 3rd July. The admission rate is shown in Fig. 3. blood cultures from patients with pyrexia of unknown origin had grown S. typhi, and the next day added yet another. Thus between 19th to 23rd May, 13 cases of typhoid fever had been established mainly on blood culture evidence. The further explosive course of the outbreak and its demand on laboratory facilities is seen in Table IV which lists chronologically the investigations undertaken in the City Hospital Laboratory and the Bacteriology Department of the University of Aberdeen.
In the City Hospital Laboratory extra voluntary and paid personnel were recruited until staff had risen from 19 technicians to 27; 9 laboratory maids to 12; and 9 office staff to 24. For weeks the laboratory was open from 6 a.m. till 10 p.m. daily, coping with routine work as well as the demands of the epidemic.
With the University Bacteriology Department committed, arrangements were made with the North of Scotland College of Agriculture and the Rowett Research Institute to take over, within 24 hours' notice if required, the full laboratory staffs and facilities available at both establishments. This did not become necessary.
'Widal' agglutination tests. In the beginning, these were done on a full scale pattern. It was soon necessary in the City Hospital Laboratory to abandon the full range and confine the test to S. typhi 'H' and '0' suspensions only. As the number of incoming bloods continued to increase, a final cut was made and sera in dilutions of 1/25, 1/50, 1/100, 1/200 and 1/400 were tested against S. typhi 'H' suspension only. This final abbreviation allowed 3 sets of tests to be set up and read daily and 3 sets of results issued daily.
It was realised that the abbreviations of the agglutination tests would raise difficulties in the interpretation of positive results especially in T.A.B. immunised individuals. However, since all positive results were communicated by telephone to the doctors concerned, warning regarding interpretation was possible and according to the clinical background, repeat specimens for evidence of rising titres could be requested. Further cover was ensured since clot cultures were being done on all bloods and at least 3 faeces and 3 urine specimens were also to be examined.
Clot cultures. The decision taken early in the outbreak to culture the clot from bloods submitted for 'Widal' tests proved most rewarding. Of 11,043 such cultures, 153 were positive for S. typhi and 122 cases received their first bacteriological confirmation from this procedure. By performing on each specimen of clotted blood both agglutination tests and cultures, the laboratory was able to conserve supplies of normal blood culture outfits for which there was a brisk demand by hospitals.
Blood cultures. Of these, 798 were examined and all except 2 were submitted from hospitals. In all, 94 cases were confirmed as typhoid fever by orthodox blood culture techniques.
Faeces examination. The number of faeces examined in the City Hospital Laboratory was 23,290 of which 775 were positive for S. typhi, and 163 of these were first confirmatory isolations. A further 810 faeces examined in the University Laboratory yielded 128 positives of which 17 were first confirmatory isolations. In all, the diagnosis of typhoid fever by positive stool culture was achieved in 180 cases.
Urine examination. A total of 21,249 urines were cultured in the City Hospital Laboratory with 45 positive results of which 6 were first confirmatory isolations. 471 were cultured in the University Laboratory with 9 positive isolations of which one was a first confirmatory isolation.
Vi-agglutinations. These were undertaken only in the City Hospital Laboratory and on each serum submitted a modified 'Widal' test was also done using S. typhi 'H' and '0' and S. para-typhi B 'H' and '0' suspensions.
The Vi-agglutinations were performed with strict observance of the instructions issued by the Standards Laboratory for Serological Reagents, Central Public Health Laboratcry, London.
Up to 31st December 1964, tests had been carried out on all typhoid and suspect cases immediately before discharge from hospital and 3 months after discharge. Further followup examinations are planned for up to 2 years from discharge after which the information obtained will be studied and the results made known.
Foodstuffs, etc. A total of 196 materials within this category was examined locally commencing on 21st May. Specimens submitted were varied including samples of cooked and uncooked meats, unopened cans of cooked meats, meat produce such as pies, bakery products, swa bs from slicing machines, etc. From none was S. typhi isolated.
Sewer swabs. Up to 31st Decem bel' 1964, 453 sewer swabs have been examined by a The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak of 1964 variety of techniques. Of these swabs, 10 were positive for S. typhi and 1 for S. typhimurium. Since this campaign is still in progress and techniques, media, etc. are still under investigation the ultimate findings will be made known later.
Phage typing. The first isolation which confirmed the diagnosis in each case was sent to the Enteric Reference Laboratory, Central Public Health Laboratory, London. All cultures reported were of phage type 34 as have been all S. typhi isolations from sewer swabs to date.
Clinical features
The patients were cared for independently by II physicians * and their staffs in their own wards, though discussions on common problems and projects were held at intervals.
The patients admitted as possible cases of typhoid in whom this diagnosis was finally ruled out had a variety of illnesses. Some diagnoses were: respiratory infections with mild diarrhoea (in children), Sonne dysentery, non-specific diarrhoea, streptococcal sore throat, staphylococcal septicaemia, staphylococcal endocarditis, urinary infection, infective hepatitis, measles, German measles and, perhaps not surprisingly, myocardial infarction.
Some patients had no symptoms at all or developed them only after admission, having been found on examination as contacts to have positive clot or stool cultures, or positive Widal tests. In the previously inoculated, a two-tube rise of typhi 'H' titre on repetition of the test was considered to warrant admission. The great majority of those so admitted were confirmed. Even so, there were some insoluble diagnostic problems in the previously inoculated, from the Boer War onwards, and some of these had important public health and commercial implications.
Symptoms and signs (Table V) . Earlier patients had an illness like gastro-enteritis coming on a few days after infection, with vomiting, diarrhoea, headache and usually high fever, sometimes with epistaxis or neck stiffness; one pyrexial patient had a lumbar Asymptomatic excreters are known to occur in typhoid fever, and a symptomatic bacteraemia has been found experimentally in volunteers (Snyder et al., 1964) . Of the 507 patients in this outbreak, 30 were completely without symptoms, and a further 15 had only minimal symptoms such as mild headache for a few days. Of these 45 cases, 24 were confirmed bacteriologically and II not confirmed.
puncture. Another had an appendicectomy. These presumably had the full weight of infection, with an early enteritic phase. Later patients had malaise, headache and fever perhaps remitting fully or in part for a day or two, then developed, often suddenly, severe headache and high fever with muscle pains and diarrhoea or constipation with a feeling of distension. Tachycardia was almost invariably found in proportion to the fever. Moderate leucopoenia was found in some and reached the order of 2000 per c.mm. in a few of the more seriously ill.
The last patient of the epidemic, a 65-year-old man, was admitted on 31st July. He ate of forbidden fruit on 15th May and had diarrhoea and vomiting the following day. He was vaguely unwell at intervals thereafter, but not until 10th July was he really ill, with fever and jaundice for three weeks before admission. He responded well to chloramphenicol but relapsed again on 20th August with positive blood culture. He was re-admitted in December, 2 months after discharge, with typhoid osteomyelitis of the spine. .
Frequency Percentage
T.A.B. injections had been received in the past by 119 of the 507 patients (23'5%). These were divided amongst the diagnostic groups as shown in Table VI . Thus 74 per cent of the patients in whom the diagnosis was not confirmed had been inoculated. Whatever else inoculation may do it makes the certain diagnosis of typhoid much more difficult. There is in fact evidence that in this outbreak there were significantly fewer severe, and more mild patients among the previously inoculated than in the uninoculated. This important and difficult matter will be reported in detail elsewhere.
Incubation periods were ascertained in 378 patients. They ranged from 2 to 39 days. The mean was 13·1 days and the standard deviation 6·7.
Treatment. All but 18 of the adults treated initially were given chloramphenicol alone. Of these 18, II had various combinations of drugs and 7 received ampicillin alone, usually in a dose of 4 g. daily, but were selected for this treatment because of the apparent mildness of the illness, 3 being apyrexial from the start. In the initial illness, therefore, no comparison is possible between ampicillin and chloramphenicol used alone in adults. In one group of children, ampicillin was preceded or followed by chloramphenicol, and the details of these treatments are given in Table VII .
Chloramphenicol dosage was rather low by the best modern standards, which prescribe at least 50 mg. per kg. daily for the first week or longer, and a somewhat smaller dose for a variable period thereafter. Various regimes were used, but most adults had 500 mg. 6hourly for a week, then 250 mg. 6-hourly. About 80 had 3 g. daily for the first few days with or without a 'loading dose' of I to 4 g. intravenously or intramuscularly. Two severely ill patients given high initial loading dose had a 'toxic crisis' with hypotension requiring intravenous hydrocortisone. Awareness of the hazard of chloramphenicol had gone deep; nearly all the treatments were limited to 14 days and none exceeded 24. The highest total dose of chloramphenicol was 82 g., in a patient sensitive to ampicillin who had two severe relapses. Of the 390 patients given chloramphenicol 7 gave sensitivity reactions but no marrow aplasia has been found on follow-up at 3-month[y intervals. Monilial infections of the mouth were troublesome in a few of the more ill patients. Fifty-one had sore throat or tongue while having chlorarnphenicol.
The dose of ampicillin likely to be effective in typhoid is probably not less than 100 mg. per kg. daily. The dosage used in the initial illness, both for adults and children, was far smaller than this (Table VII) making comparison with chloramphenicol unfair. A better comparison is possibly found in the treatment of relapses in adults (Table VIII) , though again there was a tendency to give ampicillin to the less severely ill. Though the clinical impression was that 8 g. of ampicillin daily was more effective than 4 g., the differ-ence in duration of pyrexia in the two groups is not significant. The relative clinical inefficacy of ampicillin in a dose of 4 g. daily (for adults) is further shown by the occurrence of relapse in 6 of 54 patients receiving this treatment in the course of a trial of ampicillin in the early 'convalescent' excreters. A major disadvantage in the use of ampicillin was the high incidence of allergic reactions, chiefly in the form of an itchy morbilliform, scarlatiniform or purpuric rash. In all, [98 patients were given ampicillin, the majority for persistent excretion whether early or [ate. Of these [98, 39 (19,7%) gave sensitivity reactions and must now be considered for practical purposes allergic to penicillin. The mean duration of pyrexia in children on chloramphenicol and on ampicillin is significantly different (p, < 0'01). The mean duration of pyrexia in children on the two mixed treatments is also significantly different (p. < 0'01). Outcome and complications (Table IX) . Four days after the end of treatment the clearance regime was started: this consisted of 3 paired specimens of stool and urine at 4d ay intervals, and 3 consecutive negatives of each allowed the patient to be discharged Other treatment. Cephaloridine 2 g. daily was given to 3 patients in the initial illness and to 2 in relapse, without apparent effect; in 2, blood culture was positive on the third day of treatment (Walker, 1964) . One patient had a 6 weeks' illness showing little if any response to chloramphenicol, ampicillin or cephaloridine, though the organism was sensitive in vitro. Eleven patients in relapse responded very well to a combination of chloramphenicol and chlortetracycline, I g. of each daily as recommended by Huckstep (1963) . Eight patients were given methacycline (Rondomycin), 3 for relapse and 5 for persistent excretion; the results were unsuccessful or inconclusive. Five patients were given adrenocortical steroids, and 3 intravenous fluids. One blood transfusion was given for melaena. from hospital. Three hundred and thirty patients had an uncomplicated clearance in hospital, but 14 of these were re-admitted because of relapse, and 27 had a positive stool after discharge. The management of persistent excreters at different stages will be described elsewhere.
One old woman with severe cerebral arteriosclerosis and uraemia died in the second week of illness, one woman of 60 years had a massive pulmonary embolus in a relapse, and an old man died of bronchopneumonia. All of the recorded thromboembolic complications, except the fatal one, were obvious and 4 were severe. Two patients with cardiac failure had valvular disease and the others were frail old people. Iron-deficiency anaemia of varying severity was found in some women, and Addisonian anaemia in one old woman. Many patients on discharge had a mild normocytic anaemia which had disappeared on follow-up in 3 months. Hairfall, transient and mostly slight or moderate, afflicted about 43 per cent of patients, chiefly women and children, in the few weeks after discharge.
Relapse. Marmion's definition (1952) of a relapse was used: 'a return offever of 100°F. or more, lasting 2 days or more, unless some other adequate cause can be found to account for the episode' This definition was not altogether satisfactory in differentiating the 86 patients regarded as having suffered a relapse from the 125 with 'post-treatment pyrexia' if the decisive evidence of positive blood culture was lacking; arbitrary judgment was necessary in some borderline cases. Several of the relapses, particularly in children, were virtually asymptomatic and may well have been only 'post-treatment pyrexias' (Table X) . The interval from end of treatment to onset of relapse had a mean of 13 days, and from end of pyrexia 22 days. These calculations exclude one moderately severe relapse, with positive blood culture, after an exceptionally long interval of 99 days from end of treatment and 109 days from end of pyrexia. It occurred in a 43-year-old man who in this interval had had a succession of pulmonary emboli.
The reported incidence of relapse in both treated and untreated typhoid varies very widely indeed, but it seems certain that chloramphenicol treatment lasting 10 to 15 days gives more relapses than are found in untreated typhoid, apparently because the normal immunity mechanism is denied the chance to respond. Relapse rates of between 5 and 50 per cent have been reported with initial treatment of this duration. To reduce relapses to a minimum one would have to cover with treatment the natural course of the disease, usually about 28 days but often much longer, and recent recommendations have been made to this effect. However, this The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak of 1964 would mean exposing a majority, perhaps a very large majority, of patients to unnecessarily prolonged courses of chloramphenicol. The compromise between potential toxicity and undoubted benefit adopted in this outbreak seems a reasonable one. Ampicillin is, of course, an alternative either for initial treatment in which it could be given, if tolerated, for 4 weeks or longer; or as a follow-up treatment after a shorter course of chloramphenicol; or for the treatment of relapses. It may be noteworthy that no clinical relapse occurred in the 25 children initially treated with ampicillin alone. Its comparative effectiveness in really ill patients, however, needs further study, and the risk of inducing penicillin sensitivity is not a factor to be ignored completely.
